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This research investigates the impact of indebtedness on per-capita GDP growth in 12 euro 
area countries, over a period from 1995 to 2014. Among other contributions, this research adds 
to the existing literature by studying both the effect of public and non-financial corporations’ debt 
on economic growth, using a dynamic panel threshold model. While being ambiguous for 
nonfinancial corporations, the empirical results suggest that public debt has a nonlinear impact on 
growth and that the accumulation of public debt in the euro area after the financial crisis has been one 
of the responsible factors for the lethargic growth verified in that monetary union.  
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1. Introduction 
The build-up of large stocks of national debt on the euro area countries in the period after the 
financial crises raises concerns on its real impact on the economy and how such impact may affect 
governments’ ability to conduct countercyclical policies. Summing public and nonfinancial 
corporations’ (NFC) debt, referred to as national debt1 from now on, euro area countries currently have, 
on average, a stock of debt above 220%. In only 2 of its countries one can find values of national debt 
below 150%. 
 Moreover, the record of anaemic growth in the euro area during the last 7 years2 further alerts for 
the need of a deeper knowledge on the dynamics through which the volume of domestic debt affects a 
country’s economic performance. Is there a nonlinear impact of indebtedness on growth, such that, since 
the financial crisis, high and rising national debt stocks have been shrinking the euro zone growth 
prospects? The development of empirical frameworks to answer this question is of central importance 
to sustain policy designing aiming at recovering euro area economic growth and employment.  
                                                          
1 This definition of national debt excludes households, non-profit institutions serving households and financial 
corporations’ debt, since these institutional sectors are out of the scope of this research.   
2 Between 2008 and 2015, the euro area per-capita GDP diminished by 1.4%, while in the previous 7-year 
period, from 2001 to 2008, it increased by 9.0%. For a deeper understanding of the evolution of debt-to-GDP 
ratios and of per-capita GDP growth of Eurozone countries, see graphs 1, 2 and 3 in appendix. 




This paper adds to the existing literature by i) studying not only the effect of public debt but also 
of non-financial corporations debt on economic growth, ii) focusing on the euro zone, backing specific 
policy designing for this economic and political area iii) using a framework that allows for nonlinear 
relations between debt and growth, iv) endogenously estimating the possible breakpoint of the nonlinear 
relation, v) using a growth model that controls for variables that may determine growth beside the level 
of indebtedness and, finally, vi) performing both a short and medium run analysis. 
The empirical study is performed over a panel data of 12 euro area countries, from 1995 to 2014. 
The results support the hypothesis of a nonlinear relation between debt and per-capital GDP growth. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that public debt increases have a positive effect on output up to a certain 
debt-to-GDP threshold, which is estimated to be between 96% and 105% in the short-run, and around 
72% in the medium-run. Above these breakpoints, additional debt has a negative impact on growth. 
Additionally, one can find that marginally increasing NFC’ indebtedness has always a negative impact 
on growth in the medium-run, becoming lower if NFC’ debt is above a threshold around 60% of debt-
to-GDP ratio. 
2. Literature Review 
The debate regarding how national indebtedness relates to economic growth, and whether very 
high levels of debt have a negative real effect has been vivid among academia and policymakers in the 
recent past. The mounting stocks of debt in developing countries and the world lacklustre growth since 
the financial crisis has intensified this debate. In pair with the extensive theoretical literature, a growing 
empirical work has been focusing on the relation of these two macroeconomic variables. In spite of that, 
this literature is mainly focused on the effects of public debt on growth, while devoting a trifling 
importance to NFC’ indebtedness. This literature review reflects such shortfall. 
National debt may influence growth through a series of possible channels. Hence, the ambiguous 
impact of debt on growth is consistent across schools of economic thought, and no consensual analysis 
of this relation has been attained in the theoretical literature. Nonetheless, a considerable number of 
recent empirical articles, focusing on public debt, highlights that this ambiguous relation may result 




from a nonlinear impact of indebtedness on growth, i.e., the impact on growth becomes negative when 
indebtedness is above a given breakpoint. 
The economic effects of alternative forms of financing government spending, i.e. taxes vs. public 
debt, has had a seminal contribution by Ricardo (1817), setting a classical framework for the study of 
public debt that later strongly influenced the neoclassical thought. The Ricardian Equivalence 
hypothesis suggests rational consumers recognize that the finance of budget deficits through public debt 
incurrence implies future taxation, whose present value equals the value of the incurred debt. Thus, these 
consumers will raise private savings to pay future taxation, exactly offsetting the decrease in public 
savings. Accordingly, rational consumers do not regard government bonds as net wealth, since the 
present value of these bonds’ yields equals the present value of future taxation. Following this reasoning, 
as suggested by Barro (1974), debt is neutral in economic terms. Almost one and a half century after the 
formulation of the Ricardian Equivalence, Modigliani and Miller (1958) propound an analogous 
hypothesis to NFC, postulating that the market value of a firm is independent of its liability structure. 
Hence, in this framework, entrepreneurs become indifferent between the use of debt or capital to finance 
new projects.  
Several contributions were made in the neoclassical setting. Following this school of thought, the 
negative impact of public debt in the long-run growth rate may arise from the distortionary taxes 
collected to finance the interest payment, reducing disposable income, and consequently national 
savings and capital stock (Diamond, 1965). In this same setting, Modigliani (1961) postulates that 
national debt has two main impacts. It originates a transfer from future generations to current 
generations, “to the extent of taxes levied on the former to pay interest to the latter” and a “permanent 
burden on society as a whole to the extent that the stock of capital is permanently reduced”, due to 
decreased national savings. However, the author suggests that this burden may be offset. On the one 
hand, due to multiplier effects, the gains in income to current generations may be higher than the present 
value of lost income streams from future generations. On the other hand, there may be a consumption 
smoothing effect. In this line of reasoning, Modigliani (1998) points out that a significant amount of 
“existing wealth is the result of a bequest”. Therefore, national debt may arise as a mean to raise the 




society’s intertemporal welfare, by charging future generations the cost of investments whose yields 
they will inherit, such as the investment in education or other type of human capital formation.3 
Still regarding the neoclassic framework, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) revise “the debates over 
the effects of government debt”, concluding that debt has important effects in economic growth, both in 
the short and medium-run. In the short run, the authors posit that increases in public debt have a positive 
effect on household’s disposable income, through fiscal expansionary policies, further expanding the 
aggregate demand and fuelling economic growth. However, in the long-run, the authors suggest that 
these policies lead to a crowding-out of total investment, resulting in a smaller private capital stock and 
lower labour productivity, ”which in turn implies lower output and income”. Barro (1979) departs from 
Kydland and Prescott’s (1978) conclusion that the optimal taxation policy is a constant marginal tax 
rate4, to construct a theory of public debt creation. This theory suggests that public debt has a positive 
impact on growth, to the extent that it is used to smooth the consumption of tax revenues to follow 
optimal taxation and public finance policies. 
Similar ambiguous results were derived in the context of endogenous growth models. Saint-Paul 
(1992), using public debt levels as a proxy for fiscal policy, verified that an increase in public debt 
reduced the growth rate, even under the assumption of a balanced-growth above the interest rate level.5 
Barro (1990) postulates that increases in government services, which are positively correlated with 
indebtedness levels, have two opposite effects on growth. They crowd-out investment, while leading to 
capital productivity gains through an increase of public productive investment. Therefore, debt 
accumulation may promote economic growth up to a certain threshold, above which it will have a 
negative impact on growth, ultimately leading the economy to “converge to a low growth path in the 
long-run” (Greiner, 2013).    
Alongside with the latter studies, some authors focused specifically on the negative impact of debt 
on growth on regimes of extremely high indebtedness. Fisher’s (1933) “Debt-Deflation Theory” relates 
                                                          
3 In this framework of analysis, Cukierman and Meltzer(1989) formalize a model of government debt in a Neo-
Ricardian framework, in which public debt is used as a mean to leave negative bequest to future generations. 
4 This hypothesis assumes consumers have separable preferences between goods and leisure. 
5 Saint-Paul(1992) suggests that in a neoclassical framework, if the interest rate is below the growth rate, there 
is scope for an improvement of the intertemporal allocation of consumption through an increase in public debt, 
by moving the interest rate closer to the golden rule level. 




national over-indebtedness with a contraction of deposits and money velocity, due to a distressed selling 
of assets that leads to deflation and recession. Krugman (1988) defines “debt overhang” as a situation 
in which a country has such an enormous stock of external national debt that investors no longer expect 
to be fully repaid. High levels of public debt and disarrayed government’s finances may also “unanchor” 
inflation expectations, likely “leading to stagflation rather than to a boomlet of growth” (Cochrane, 
2011). Other authors further suggest that extreme national debt surges predict the emergence of financial 
crises (Schularick and Taylor, 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013) and that leveraged borrowing has a 
pro-cyclical behaviour over the business cycle, hypothesis commonly known as the leverage cycles 
(Geanakopolos,2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2009). Minsky(1977) and Kindleberger(1978) go further 
in the discussion of this disruptive effect of national debt, suggesting that the pro-cyclicality of credit 
supply produces economic instability and creates the “internal dynamics of capitalist economies”6, 
increasing the likelihood of financial crises. Still in this regard, Buttiglione, Lane, Reichlin and Reinhart 
(2014) posit that countries with high levels of national indebtedness may incur in a vicious cycle. High 
levels of debt lead to lower growth, which in turn makes deleverage more laborious and ultimately feeds 
back to lower growth rates. 
As a country or agent’s indebtedness increases, the ability to repay its debts is increasingly affected 
by the volatility of its income. Further, the pro-cyclicality of credit supply possibly implies that high 
levels of debt highjacks the ability of countries and agents to conduct counter-cyclical policies, 
exacerbating business cycles and depressing growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Notwithstanding, both 
the ability to conduct counter-cyclical policies and the impact of debt on growth could be not the direct 
result of high levels of debt, but instead, directly influenced by the debt structure. Hausman and Panizza 
(2011) suggest that the root of these dynamics is the composition of debt, such that countries whose 
indebtedness is mainly denominated in external currencies have “less room for counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies”. A similar conclusion is put forward by De Grawe (2011), who suggests that countries in 
monetary unions, by losing “their capacity to issue debt in a currency over which they have full control”, 
may lose investors’ confidence and enter in self-fulfilling paths that drive the country into default.  
                                                          
6 Minsky(1977) 




The hypothesis that the debt structure and the functional characteristics of credit flows is in the 
root of the relation of national debt and growth has also been explored in a more unorthodox 
fashion. Schumpeter (1939) draws a distinction between the direct provision of credit to the nonfinancial 
sector, which promotes innovation and growth, and the credit provided for innovations on financial 
markets, whose effects on economic output the author suggests to be ambiguous. Similarly, Keynes 
(1930) further distinguished “money in industrial circulations” to “money in the financial circulations”. 
Such reasoning is closely connected to Marx’s (1862) contrasting concepts of industrial capital and 
banking capital. This distinction between credit supplied to productive sectors and credit supplied to 
financial sectors draws attention to possible distinctive effects of national debt on growth according to 
its function. 
In summary, according to the theoretical literature, increases in national indebtedness may i) be 
neutral, both referring to public debt, if agents perceive it as future taxation and increase private savings 
accordingly, and to NFC debt, if the Modigliani and Miller (1958) hypothesis hold; ii) have a positive 
effect on economic growth due to an intertemporal consumption smoothing, and, referring to public debt 
alone, an increase in households’ disposable income as a result of fiscal expansionary policies, a smooth 
of tax revenues or an increase in public productive investment; iii) have a negative impact on output 
growth arising from the pro-cyclical effect of the credit supply, increasing the likelihood of financial 
crises, or may result from a contraction of deposits and money velocity. Referring to public debt alone, 
this negative impact may also arise due to the distortionary taxes collected to finance interest payment, 
the crowding out of investments that decreases national stock of capital, or from the “unanchor” of 
inflation expectations. 
Turning to the growing empirical literature on the relation between debt and growth, several 
studies, mainly focused on public debt, found evidences regarding the existence of a nonlinear relation 
between these two variables. One of the most prominent analysis of this issue is the contribution of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). In “Growth in a Time of Debt”, the authors advance that, while there is no 
evidence of a relationship between public debt and real GDP growth below a breakpoint of 90%, 
countries with public debt levels above 90% have a considerably lower output growth. Using a database 




of 20 advanced economies and yearly data from 1946 to 2009, this argument is illustrated with the 
computation of median and average GDP growth over 4 debt regimes, consisting of “years when debt 
to GDP levels were below 30 percent (low debt); years where debt/GDP was 30 to 60 percent (medium 
debt); 60 to 90 percent (high); and above 90 percent (very high)”. While in the low, medium and high 
debt regimes there is no evidence of debt and output growth being linked, in the very high debt regime 
“The observations (…) have median growth roughly 1 percent lower than the lower debt burden groups 
and mean levels of growth almost 4 percent lower”.  
These findings have been recently challenged by Ash, Herdon and Pollin (2013), who showed that 
the threshold effect is not robust to the correction of the coding and weighting errors that Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) presumably incurred. In spite of that, the seminal empirical contribution of these two 
authors sparked the empirical research on the issue and the debate is still vivid. The remaining part of 
this section reviews this empirical debate, to which this research aims at being a contribution. During 
the course of this review, special focus is devoted to three important estimation issues: i) whether the 
authors impose or estimate the debt-to-GDP threshold level(s), ii) whether the authors control for 
additional explanatory variables beyond debt and iii) whether (and how) the authors address possible 
endogeneity and reverse causality problems. 
Kumar and Woo (2010) address this subject based on a panel of 38 developed and emerging 
economies from 1970 to 2007. Comparably to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), nonlinearities are accounted 
for by imposing two break points, which consist of public debt levels of 30% and 90% of GDP, 
respectively. However, instead of computing simple medians and averages of growth rates across 
regimes and not controlling for other determinants of growth, as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Kumar 
and Woo (2010) follow Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) findings on the determinants of long-run growth to 
construct a growth model, which is later augmented with debt levels. In addition, given that lower 
growth may lead to high debt build-ups, this reverse causality problem is avoided making use of debt 
levels in lagged terms. This growth regression is based on non-overlapping five-year-periods, so as to 
capture a long-term relation between public debt and economic growth. The results are consistent with 
the hypothesis of nonlinearities in this relation. The coefficients of public debt are negative and 
significant in the high debt regime, both in advanced and emerging economies. These estimates suggest 




that, in advanced economies, a 1 percentage point increase in public debt, when debt is above 90% of 
GDP, is associated with a decrease in growth of 0.015% to 0.02%, while in emerging economies this 
depressive impact is of 0.03% to 0.04%.  
Similarly, Checherita and Rother (2012) study the impact of public debt on growth on 12 euro area 
countries in a time period spanning from 1970 to 2011. To test the existence of nonlinearities, instead 
of arbitrarily defining the threshold and not controlling for other explanatory variables, a growth model 
with a quadratic specification of debt is set. The results confirm the existence of a highly significant 
nonlinear relation, suggesting that the turning point is, in broad terms, between 90% and 100%. This 
leads the authors to conclude that, “in the current economic environment, the results represent an 
additional argument in favour of swiftly implementing ambitious strategies for debt reduction”. The 
endogeneity issue is corrected for by using the debt-to-GDP ratio in lagged terms, instrumenting it for 
each country with the average debt ratio in the other 11 countries. This former method is used because 
it is assumed that “there are no strong spillover effects between debt levels in euro area countries and 
per-capita GDP growth rate in one specific country”. This supposition may be problematic, given that, 
if debt significantly affects growth in each country, the assumption implies that the economic 
performance of an euro area country is not affected by the output growth of the remaining euro area 
countries, which may be hard to sustain given the strong interdependencies between euro area countries 
in external trade. 
In another empirical analysis focused on the euro area alone Baum, Cecherita-Westphal and Rother 
(2012), resort to a dynamic threshold panel methodology, similar to the one described in the following 
section, to assess possible nonlinearities in the short-run relation of public debt and GDP growth. Hence, 
an endogenous estimation of the debt-to-GDP threshold is performed, controlling for additional 
explanatory variables. The data covers 12 euro area countries, with yearly observations from 1990 to 
2010. Being used a dynamic panel model, i.e. one of the explanatory variables is the lagged dependent 
variable (the lagged per-capita GDP growth), an endogeneity problem arises by construction. This 
endogeneity problem and the reverse causality between debt and growth are addressed by performing a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure, such that the lagged per-capita GDP growth and the debt-to-




GDP ratio are regressed in their own suitable lags, plus the exogenous regressors. The results indicate 
that three different debt-regimes exist in which public debt has a different impact on growth. When debt 
is below 66% of GDP, a 1 percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP implies an increase in the output 
growth by 0.05 percentage points, when debt is between 66% and 96% of GDP, the impact of debt on 
GDP is not significant, while when debt is above 96% of GDP, one additional percentage point of debt-
to-GDP ratio leads to a decrease in output growth of 0.06 percentage points.  
In addition, Cechetti et al (2011) focus on 18 OECD countries, from 1980 to 2010, to deliver an 
empirical study of the long-run impact of debt on growth. The research was performed by analysing the 
impact of household, nonfinancial corporations and government debt separately. Following Islam 
(1995), a growth model with country-fixed effects was constructed, hence controlling for additional 
determinants of growth. Additionally, overlapping five-year forward averages of per capita GDP growth 
rate were used. The estimation method follows Hansen’s (1999) inference theory to assess the threshold 
effect, and the endogeneity problem is addressed by introducing the potentially endogenous regressors 
in lagged terms. For public debt, a breaking point around 96% was estimated, above which a 1 
percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP ratio would decrease long-run output growth by 0.014 
percentage points. Regarding nonfinancial corporations and households’ indebtedness, no significant 
relation with per-capita GDP was obtained.  
Finally, Afonso and Jalles (2013) study the relation of public debt and growth, both by imposing 
and estimating possible debt-to-GDP threshold level(s). In the former framework, similar to the one 
applied by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), the authors find that, for OECD countries with public debt-to-
GDP ratios above 90%, an increase of 10% of the debt ratio has a 0.2% depressive impact on growth, 
while for countries with debt-to-GDP ratios below 30%, an increase of 10% of the debt ratio has a 
positive effect on growth by 0.1%. In the endogenous estimation of the threshold debt ratio, with a 
methodology similar to the one presented in the following section, the authors estimate a threshold effect 
around 59% of debt-to-GDP ratio. Following the empirical literature on the issue, endogeneity is 
accounted for using the endogenous variables in lagged terms, and using instrumental variable 
estimations with suitable lagged levels of these variables. 





This research uses a panel of 12 euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and 20 years of yearly data (from 
1995 to 2014), to investigate possible nonlinearities in the relationship of public and NFC’ debt-to-GDP 
ratios with the per capita GDP growth rate. To do so, a database was constructed by the author, whose 
main sources are the AMECO and the Eurostat databases. Further details on the construction of the 
database may be found in section A.1 of the appendix.  
The dynamic panel threshold model used follows Kremer et al (2013) in extending Hansen’s (1999) 
seminal work on static panel threshold models to account for endogenous regressors. The choice of this 
empirical framework resides in the fact that i) it allows for the study of a possible nonlinear relation 
between debt and growth, ii) it allows for endogenous estimation of the threshold of the possible 
nonlinear relation, and iii) it allows to control for other determinants of growth besides debt-to-GDP 
ratios.  As in Kremer et al (2013), the endogenous regressor lagged income (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1) is used, but while 
these authors develop a dynamic panel threshold model to analyse threshold effects in the impact of 
inflation on GDP growth, this research focuses on threshold effects in the impact of indebtedness on 
GDP growth. Further endogeneity issues may arise from the indebtedness variable itself. As suggested 
by Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), “we can expect reverse causation between GDP 
growth rates and debt levels (low growth rates are likely to result in higher debt-to-GDP ratios)”.  
The issue of endogeneity will be treated following Caner and Hansen’s (2004) GMM estimator 
and inference theory for cross-section models, with a set of partly endogenous regressors and a threshold 
variable. This extends Hansen’s (1999) static panel threshold to a panel threshold with endogenous 
variables, as suggested by Kremer et al (2013). 
In this section, the model construction is described in three phases. Firstly, a linear growth equation 
is specified, based on the empirical literature on economic growth. Secondly, the model is augmented 
to account for the impact of debt-to-GDP ratios, whether public or NFC’, on per capita GDP growth. 
Finally, dummy variables interacting with the intercept and with the debt-to-GDP ratio are inserted in 
the third phase, allowing for nonlinearities between indebtedness and economic growth. 




i. Linear Growth Equation 
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) on the determinants of economic growth, the linear 
growth equation is specified based on a Solow-Swan Ramsey conditional convergence model. The latter 
relates “the real per capita growth rate to two kinds of variables: first, initial levels of state variables, 
such as the stock of physical capital and the stock of human capital(…), and second, (...) environment 
variables, such as the extent of international openness”7. Both a short-run and a medium-run analysis is 
conducted, by using a specification with yearly data and a specification with a 3-year forward moving 
average of the per-capita GDP growth rate, respectively. This first phase linear equation is as follows: 
 𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡;                                                        (2.1) 
where 𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑘corresponds to the per capita GDP growth rate of country i in year t, if k=0, and to the 
averaged per capita GDP growth in the years t to t+k when k>08,  𝜇𝑖 corresponds to the country i 
individual effects, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1corresponds to the log of per capita GDP in country i at time t-1, 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
corresponds to the school life expectancy in tertiary education levels, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to a set of 
environmental regressors. 
Given the lack of data on physical capital, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) is followed, by using 
the lagged level of per capita GDP as a proxy of physical capital. This variable is used in logs so that its 
coefficient represents the rate of convergence to the steady-state. As suggested by Kremer et al (2013), 
the introduction of this variable may create an endogneity problem. 
Since the sample contains only developed countries, an adequate proxy for the other state variable, 
human capital, was chosen to be the school life expectancy in tertiary education (tert). The remaining 
environmental variables used are the log of the ratio of total gross savings to GDP (LSit), population 
growth rate (popit), inflation (infit) - measured as the growth rate of CPI - and a measure of openness to 
international trade (Lopenit) - measured as the log of the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
Before pursuing the second phase specification, unit-root tests of these control variables are 
performed, to test for possible non-stationarity of these variables. To do so, three different unit-roots 
                                                          
7 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003)  
8 K is set as 2 periods in the medium-run specification. 




tests in panel data context are applied. The test developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC test), the 
test developed by Im, Pesaram and Shin (2003) (IPS test), and the Fisher-Type test developed by 
Maddala and Wu (1999) (F-T test). In these unit-root tests9, the null hypothesis assesses the presence of 
nonstationarity in at least one of the series of the panel and it is tested against the hypothesis of the panel 
being stationary. These various tests make different assumptions of the asymptotic characteristics of the 
panel. While the LLC test assumes that asymptotically, the number of countries, N, tends more quickly 
to infinity than the number of periods, T, IPS test assumes that N and T are fixed, and F-T test assumes 
that while T tends to infinity, N is fixed.  
In the context of this research, as the study focuses on euro area countries alone, increasing 
asymptotically the availability of data would increase to infinity the number of times period, T, while 
maintaining stable the number of countries, N. Thus, the F-T test, whose asymptotic properties are more 
adequate to the panel of this research, are privileged, while the LLC and the IPS tests are used for 
robusteness. Table 1 summarizes the results of these tests. 
Table 1 - Stationarity tests' results 
 
The unit-root tests suggest that all variables are generated by integrated processes, except per capita 
GDP, which is stationary. As standard econometric analysis suggests, the nonstationary variables are 
first differenced so as to reduce the level of integration. The results summarized in Table 1 as well, 
confirm that these variables in first differences are stationary. Thus, the variables are transformed into 
first differences and the methodology proceeds to the second phase. 
                                                          
9 In these tests the optimal lag order is determined in individual Augmented Dickey Fuller regressions. 
Type of Model
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff
G 2.6701 -12.9162*** 1.0762 -7.9869*** 14.6566 68.4386***
Grstot 2.1409 -15.4794*** -1.0540* -10.6778*** 29.0715 89.7398***
Openness 0.6757 -16.1531*** 1.5972 -10.8946*** 12.1216 95.5261***
Real GDP Cap -9.2996*** - -6.1740*** - 51.0015*** -
Tertiary -3.0252*** -10.4865*** 0.9516 -5.556*** 20.007 56.6327***
Oldage 5.114 -3.4429*** 10.2688 -0.072*** 5.6401 53.0833***
(1)
 Corrected T-Statistic *** We can reject the null hypothesis of unit-roots with 5% significance level
(2)
 Z-Bar Statistic * We can reject the null hypothesis of unit-roots with 15% significance level
(3)
 P_MW Statistic - Maddala and Wu (1999)











ii. Introducing the impact of debt 
In the second phase the panel growth model is augmented to include the impact of indebtedness on 
per capita GDP growth. The specification assumes the form 
 𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑎 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡;                                    (2.2) 
where 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑎corresponds to the debt-to-GDP ratio of institutional sector a, where a is the general 
government or NFC, of country i in period t-1. The indebtedness variable is introduced in lagged terms 
to avoid contemporaneous endogeneity, as suggested by the empirical literature revised. 
In the econometric framework of panel data, the individual effects, 𝜇𝑖, control for unobservable 
variables that introduce individual heterogeneity in the model, such as cultural or geographical 
characteristics that affect the dependent variable. As suggested by Hausman (1979), there are two main 
alternative procedures to treat the individual effects in panel data models. The fixed effects models, 
which assume that the unobservable variables are correlated with the explanatory variables, treating the 
individual effects as a fixed constant that differs across countries, and, in alternative, the random effects 
models, in which the unobservable variables are assumed to be random and not correlated with the 
explanatory variables, treating the individual effects as drawn “from an idd distribution, 𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)”10. 
To determine the correct procedure to deal with individual effects, the Hausman Test11 is 
performed. The test assesses the null hypothesis that both models produce consistent estimators, against 
the alternative that only the fixed effects model would do so. The results of the Hausman test are 
summarized in Table 5 in the appendix, suggesting that the fixed effects model is the most adequate in 
this context, given the rejection of the null hypothesis. Thus, individual effects are specified as fixed 
effects from now on. 
iii. Introducing the Threshold Effect 
In the third phase the dynamic panel threshold model is specified, by introducing dummy variables 
that allow the impact of indebtedness in per capita GDP growth rate to vary across two regimes. 
The panel threshold growth model is specified as 
                                                          
10 Hausman(1979) 
11 Ibidem 




 𝑔𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼0𝐼(𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎 ≤ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎
∗ ) + 𝛼1𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑎𝐼(𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎 ≤ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎
∗ ) + 𝛼2𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑎𝐼(𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎 > 𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎
∗ )
+ 𝛼3𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡;                                                         (2.3) 
The debt-to-GDP ratio, 𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎, is, in this specification, both a regime dependent variable and the 
threshold variable. The coefficients of the lagged per capita GDP, of tert, and the remaining control 
variables are assumed to be regime independent. 𝐼(𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎 > 𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎
∗ ) is the dummy variable, taking the 
value 1 if the value of indebtedness is above the threshold, and 0 otherwise. 𝐼(𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎 ≤ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎
∗ ) is the 
dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the value of indebtedness is below or equal to the threshold, and 
0 otherwise. Following Bick (2010), differences in the intercepts across regimes, 𝛼0, are incorporated 
in the specification. 
4. Estimation Strategy 
Firstly, in the estimation process fixed effects are removed, eliminating the country specific effects. 
As suggested by Kremer et al (2013), in a dynamic panel data model, subtracting the mean of each series 
from each observations, that is, the within transformation applied by Hansen (1999) to fixed effects, 
leads to inconsistent estimates, since the possible endogenous component will “always be correlated 
with the mean of the individual errors, and thus the transformed individual errors“. Thus, a forward 
orthogonal deviation transformation to remove fixed effects, as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), 
is applied. This method implies subtracting to each observation the average of future observations, and 
avoids serial correlation in the transformed error terms. 
In a second step, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure is performed to treat possible 
endogeneity problems, that may arise through the possible correlation of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1and 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑎 with the error 
term, as suggested by Kremer et al (2013) and Baum et al (2012). Given the lack of appropriate external 
instrumental variables for the lagged per-capita GDP and the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio, suitable internal 
instruments, i.e. lagged levels of the endogenous variables, are used as suggested by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Baum et al (2012). The reduced forms of the possible endogenous variables 




𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑎 are, then, regressed as a function of the instruments
12 and the remaining control 
variables, and their predicted values replace 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑎 in equation 2.3.  
To estimate the threshold parameter, 𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑎
∗ , in equation (2.3), we apply Hansen’s (1999) 2SLS 
estimation process. Equation (2.3 )is estimated via least squares for each value of the threshold series, 
and the sum of squared residuals Sj(𝑑𝑎) of each estimation is kept. The 2SLS estimator of the threshold 
parameter minimizes the sum of squared residuals of equation (2.3), i.e., 
𝑑𝑎
^∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑  𝑆𝑗(𝑑𝑎). 
Hansen (2000) derived an asymptotic approximation to the distribution of the estimated threshold 
variable in a nondynamic model. Given the lack of a complete distribution theory for the threshold 
variable in dynamic panels13, a limitation of this procedure, the construction of confidence intervals 
applies Hansen’s (2000) distribution theory14.  
The estimation process is concluded with the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation 
of the slope coefficients of equation (2.3), with the estimated threshold 𝑑𝑎
^∗. This estimation method is 
specifically chosen to further correct for possible problems of endogeneity.15 
5. Results 
The main findings of the panel threshold growth model, as specified in equation (2.3) are described 
in this section. Table 2 summarizes the results for both short and medium-run specification regarding 
public and NFC’ debt. The annual per capita GDP growth rate is used to capture a short-run effect of 
debt on growth, while the medium-term effect is captured considering a 3-year forward moving average 
                                                          
12 Only the two first lags of the lagged per-capita GDP are significant instruments, (see Tables 6 and 7 of the 
appendix). Thus, the 2SLS procedure uses two lags of the lagged per capita GDP. Regarding the lagged debt-to-
GDP ratio, only one lag is used in the 2SLS procedure, so as to not lose additional observations, since the debt-
to-GDP ratio series only starts at 1995. This first lag of the debt-to-GDP ratio is significant (see Table 8 of 
appendix) 
13 Baum et al(2012), 
14 The null hypothesis tested implies linearity. See Hansen (2000) for further details in this estimation. 
15 Caselli et al (1996) posits that, in panel growth regressions, an adequate strategy to deal with endogeneity is 








of the same variable. In order to estimate the medium-run model, the observations of the last two years 
of the sample, i.e. 2013 and 2014, due to the averaging process, were lost. 
The results conclude in favour of the nonlinear relation between public debt and GDP growth rate. 
The short run estimation suggests that such threshold occurs around a debt-to-GDP ratio of 103%, above 
which increases in public indebtedness have a negative effect on growth. This threshold has a 95% 
significance confidence interval of 96% to 105%. The coefficient of debt in the lower debt-regime (α1) 
is positive and significant at a 10% significance level, suggesting that a 1 percentage point increase in 
debt increases gi,t by 0.01 percentage points, while in the upper debt-regime the coefficient of debt (α2) 
is negative and significant at a 5% significance level, suggesting that a 1 percentage point increase in 
debt decreases gi,t by 0.13 percentage points. The results support the hypothesis of additional public debt 
having a positive effect on growth up to a given threshold, above which this effect becomes negative, 
with a stronger impact in absolute terms. 
The medium-run estimation of the public debt specification suggests a lower breakpoint, of 72%, 
with a less efficient confidence interval of 72% to 102%, statistically significant at a 5% nominal level. 
The estimated coefficient of α1 in the medium-run has both a higher size and a higher significance than 
in the short run, and implies that a 1 percentage point increase in public indebtedness increases GDP 
growth by 0.02 percentage points, significant at a 5% significance level. On the other hand, the estimated 
coefficient of α2 is once more negative, despite being lower than in the short run. A 1 percentage point 
increase in public debt when the latter is above 72% of GDP has a negative impact on GDP growth of 
0.08 percentage points, significant at 5% nominal level. 




Table 2- Estimation results 
 
Concerning NFC’ indebtedness, the results of the short-run specification are not conclusive 
regarding the existence of a threshold effect on the relation of debt with per capita growth rate. A 
threshold is estimated at 64.4% of indebtedness in the short run, however both α1 and α2 are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the impact of NFC’ debt to GDP ratio is not significant in both 
regimes.  
However, in the medium-run specification, the results provide evidence that an increasing NFC’ 
debt has always a negative impact on per-capita GDP growth, regardless of its level. Furthermore, the 
results suggest that this negative impact is more negative below a threshold of 58%, with a confidence 
interval of 58% to 85% significant at a 5% nominal value, than above this threshold. In the medium-
run, if NFC’ debt is below 58% of GDP, a 1 percentage point increase in indebtedness decreases the 
output growth by 0.07 percentage points, while if it is above such threshold, a 1 percentage point increase 
of NFC’ debt-to-GDP ratio leads to a decrease of per-capita GDP growth rate of 0.02 percentage points. 
Non Financial Corporation's Debt
Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run
Threshold Estimate 102.8% 71.7% 64.4% 57.5%
95% confidence interval HET corr [96.2-104.9] [71.7;101.9] [57.5-69.8] [57.5-85.0]
[Observations Above; Below Threshold] [35;193] [136;68] [188;27] [174;17]
α 0 -67.385*** -45.636*** 8.880 22.412***
(18,332) (9,504) (11,102) (8,046)
α 1 1.317** 2.291*** -2.590 -7.100***
(0,746) (0,603) (3,5339) (2.440) 
α 2 -13.00*** -7.947*** -0.953 -2.214***
(3,869) (2,083) (1,76) (0,888)
Ly i,t-1 -22.229*** -20.264*** -17.982*** -13.269***
(1,426) (1,259) (4.380) (2.630)
dtert i,t -0.827 0.254 0.002 1.505**
(1,051) (1,268) (1.587) (0.996)
dLS i,t 4.727*** -2.202** 12.131** 6.889***
(2,146) (1,253) (6.659) (2.976)
inf i,t 0.547*** -0.0501 0.097 -0.293***
(0.105) (0,0873) (0.160) (0,102)
dLOpen i,t 3.927** -1.551*** 9.229*** -0.866
(2.102) (1,643) (2.892) (1.348)
pop i,t 0.159*** 0.089*** 0.170*** 0.087***
(0.033) (0,031) (0.052) (0.039)
Observations 228 204 215 191
Non-regime dependent variables coefficients
Regime summary
Public Debt




Table 3- Robustness tests 
To test the robustness of these results, further control variables were considered. These variables were 
i) the age dependency ratio - a measure of the age-structure of societies to control for the ageing 
European population ii) the terms of trade growth rate – to depict the evolution of the relative 
competitiveness of countries’ external trade, measured as the price of exports over the price of imports, 
and iii) the ratio of government consumption to GDP, to capture changes in fiscal policy. Further, 
regarding NFC’ debt, a series from a different source is used. While the baseline regression used a series 
published by Eurostat, in this robustness test the source of the NFC’ indebtedness series is the Bank of 
International Settlements Statistics database. The previous results are robust to the introduction of 
further control variables and, regarding NFC’ debt, to the change of the source of data, as summarized 
in Table 3. However, this robustness does not hold for the short-run impact of public debt on growth in 
the lower-debt regime, which became insignificant. 
Non Financial Corporation's Debt
Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run
Regime summary
Threshold Estimate 102.8% 71.7% 62.9%*** 62.50%
95% confidence interval HET corr [96.6-103.9] [69.9;71.7] [56.1-66.8] [52.6-78.5]
[Observations Above;below threshold] [35;193] [136;68] [46;168] [43;147]
α 0 -66.043** -45.848*** 19.715*** 26.101***
(-17,583) (-0,399) (8,156) (6,457)
α 1 0.565 2.238*** -6.602 -8.914***
(-0.740) (0,654) (3,208) (2,101)
α 2 -12.795*** -8.039*** -2.272 -2.844***
(3,693) (2,068) (1,914) (1,052)
Ly i,t-1 -19.801*** -21.143*** -12.575*** -10.548***
(1.556) (1,379) (5,419) (3,177)
oldage i,t -0.370 0.285 -0.883** -0.353
(0.406) (0,374) (0,503) (0,353)
dtert i,t -0.193 0.116 0.155 1.363*
(0.846) (1,277) (1,378) '(0.940)
dLG i,t -7.995 9.002** -31.524*** -15.856***
(8.001) (5,144) (7,537) (4,419)
dLS i,t 5.156*** 3.151*** 5.658*** 3.007***
(2.086) (1.390) (1,831) (1,296)
inf i,t 0.450*** -0.014 -0.242** -0.505***
(0.095) (0,086) (0,161) (0,102)
dLOpen i,t 4.322*** -1.657 3.257 -1.059
(2.160) (2,355) (3,191) (2,046)
pop i,t 0.122*** 0.089*** 0.131*** 0.074**
(0,03) (0,033) (0,0607) (0.040)
TofT i,t -0.122*** -0.085 -0.335*** -0.107*
(0,045) (0.070) (0,098) (0,071)
Observations 228 204 214 191
Public Debt
Non-regime dependent variables coefficients




6. Discussion of Results 
In the 12 euro area countries under study, the results presented above support the hypothesis of a 
nonlinear relationship between public debt and per-capital GDP growth both in the short and in the 
medium-run, whereas between NFC’ debt and per-capita GDP growth this nonlinear relationship is only 
verified in the medium-run alone.  
Regarding public indebtedness, the analysis finds evidence against the Ricardian Equivalence 
hypothesis, since public debt is not neutral in real terms, regardless of its level. Further, it suggests that, 
for countries in the Eurozone with low and medium levels of public debt, there is a tendency to 
experience an increase in real growth after an increase in debt. As the revised theoretical literature 
suggests, these positive impact of public debt may arise, among other reasons, as a result of expansionary 
fiscal policies that increase households’ disposable income or a smooth of tax revenue. However, once 
the public debt threshold is reached, the effect of debt becomes negative, i.e. additional debt build-ups 
have a negative real impact on the economy. As reviewed in the theoretical literature, this negative 
impact may arise, among other reasons, as a result of distortionary taxes collected to finance interest 
payments, a crowding out of total investment or from the increasing likelihood of financial crises. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the short-run negative impacts of high and increasing levels of 
public debt are much more severe than in the medium-run, but while in latter these negative effects are 
triggered as soon as 72% of indebtedness is reached, in the former these effects are only felt when debt 
is above 103%.  
Concerning NFC’ indebtedness, the results suggest that debt has no impact on the short-run per-
capita GDP growth rate, possibly indicating that entrepreneurs are indifferent between capital and debt 
to finance new projects, providing support for the Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) proposition. However, 
this conclusion is no longer adequate in the medium-run, since the results indicate that increases in NFC’ 
indebtedness have always a negative impact on economic growth. Moreover, this impact becomes less 
negative when NFC’ debt-to-GDP ratio is above a threshold around 60%, possibly suggesting that 
entrepreneurs, in the medium-run, have a higher preference for the use of capital to finance new project 
when NFC’ indebtedness is below such threshold. 




In summary, the revised empirical literature on this issue, which either defines or estimates the 
threshold levels of debt-to-GDP ratio, advances that the breakpoints of the nonlinear relation between 
public debt and growth assume values between 90% and 100%. Further, it suggests that a 1 percentage 
point increase of debt-to-GDP ratio in countries in the below-threshold regimes increases growth by a 
maximum of 0.05 percentage points, and in countries in the above-threshold regime, it decreases growth 
by a maximum of 0.06 percentage points. Finally, the very scarce literature that assesses the relation of 
nonfinancial corporations’ indebtedness and growth finds no correlation between the two variables. 
While the results concerning NFC’ indebtedness are not so analogous, those regarding public debt are 
sturdily comparable to this empirical literature. It is so since i) a nonlinear relation of public debt and 
growth is encountered, ii) in countries with a public debt in the below-threshold regime, an increase in 
public indebtedness has a positive impact on growth, iii) while in countries with a public debt in the 
above-threshold regime, an increase in public indebtedness has a depresive real effect on the economy.  
Referring to the estimated threshold values of public debt, the short-run estimation, which this 
research points out to be between 96% and 105%, is comparable to the empirical literature revised, while 
the medium-run estimation of the debt-to-GDP threshold, 72%, is rather lower than the empirical 
evidence found in the literature. In addition, the impact of a 1 percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the below-threshold regime, which is estimated to be positive and around 0.01 and 0.02 
percentage points in the short and in the medium-run, respectively, has a similar magnitude to the results 
of the empirical researches reviewed. Finally, an analogous increase in debt in countries under the 
above-threshold regime, which the model predicts to be negative and around 0.13 and 0.08 percentage 
points in the short and in the medium-run, respectively, is found to be slightly higher than the results of 
the empirical literature on the issue, suggesting that the negative impact on growth in the euro area of a 
high and increasing debt is somewhat higher than in other advanced countries, especially in the 
short-run. 
These are very strong results, and suggest that the accumulation of national debt in the euro area 
after the financial crisis has been one of the responsible factors for the sluggish growth verified in that 
monetary union.  




Reinhart and Rogoff (2013), revising the historical records of debt overhangs, and mainly focusing 
on public debt, suggest that advanced economies have, throughout history, made use of five different 
tracks to reduce national debt: i) economic growth, ii) fiscal adjustment, iii) debts restructurings, iv) 
inflation surprises and v) a steady dose of financial repression and of inflation. While the official policy 
approach in the euro area postulates that a constant amount of ii), i.e. austerity, will both bring countries 
indebtedness to a sustainable path and induce growth, the results of the present research argue in favour 
of policies that promote an expressive debt reduction. Such policies, as iii), iv) v), aimed at bringing 
overindebted countries to a low or medium level of indebtedness, induce both an expressive boost to the 
economy through an increased growth rate, and a recovery of the ability to incur in countercyclical 
policies without arming growth. 
7. Limitations and areas for further research 
Although the discussed results are, in general terms, in accordance with the empirical research on 
the relation of national debt and growth, some limitations on the methodology applied ought to be 
considered as a reason to bear these results with caution.  
An important limitation of this research, common across macroeconomic panel data studies, is the 
low number of observations. This limitation is inevitable, given that the euro area is a monetary union 
with less than two decades of existence, and the majority of the macro variables used are published with 
a yearly frequency. Further, some empirical literature on the issue points out the hypothesis of the 
nonlinear relation of debt and growth having more than one debt-to-GDP breakpoint. Therefore, the fact 
that the methodology applied allows the study of the existence of one threshold effect alone should be 
regarded as an additional limitation. Moreover, the confidence intervals are estimated based on Hansen 
(2000), methodology which does not take into account possible endogeneity issues.  Finally, a very 
relevant limitation regards the treatment of the possible reverse causality problem between debt and 
growth. Given the lack of appropriate external instrumental variables of debt, the methodology uses 
appropriate lagged levels of debt-to-GDP as instruments. However, given that periods of prolonged 
recession may lead to debt build-ups, it is possible that the use of appropriate lagged variables is 




insufficient to avoid the reverse causality problem. Hence, a major limitation of this study is that a 
univocal causal relationship is not totally assured.  
Further empirical developments of the analysis ought to overcome, if possible, the limitations 
mentioned above, notably the adaptation of the methodology to account for additional breakpoints of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, the development of a distribution theory for the estimated threshold taking into 
account possible endogeneity issues and the study of external instrumental variables of debt. Moreover, 
it is important to address the study of multidimensional debt build-ups, extending the study from 
government and nonfinancial corporations’ indebtedness to other institutional sectors’ debt.  
8. Conclusion 
This empirical research analysis the short and medium-run impact of government and NFC’ debt-
to-GDP ratio on per-capita GDP growth. The analysis further studies the hypothesis of the existence of 
a nonlinear relation between debt and per-capita GDP growth, such that, since the financial crisis, high 
and rising national debt stocks have contributed to the euro zone lacklustre economic performance. The 
results conclude in favour of this hypothesis in what regards both the impact of public debt and the long-
run impact of NFC’ debt, while finding no significant relation between NFC’ debt and the short-run per-
capita GDP growth. Furthermore, this empirical study provides evidence against the Ricardian 
Equivalence hypothesis and suggests that, if a country has a public debt-to-GDP ratio below the 
threshold, which the model estimates to be in the short run, between 96% and 105%, and in medium-run 
around 72%, an increase in public indebtedness has a positive effect on economic growth, possibly due 
to expansionary fiscal policies that increase households’ disposable income. By the same token, if a 
country has a public debt-to-GDP ratio above the estimated threshold, an increase in public indebtedness 
has a negative effect on economic growth, possibly due to distortionary taxes charged to cover interest 
payments or a crowding out of total investment. Moreover, concerning NFC’ indebtedness, the results 
find evidences which support the Modigliani and Miller (1958) hypothesis in the short-run, and not only 
suggest that, in the medium-run, NFC’ debt has always a negative impact on economic growth, but also 
that this impact becomes less negative if NFC’ indebtedness is above an estimated threshold around 
60%. 




These are very relevant results, and propound that one of the responsible factors for the lethargic 
growth in the euro area after the financial crisis has been the accumulation of huge stocks of national 
debt. Notwithstanding the fact that the official policy approach in the euro area is focused on fiscal 
adjustments to bring countries indebtedness to a sustainable path and induce growth, the results of this 
research gives room for the discussion of nonconventional policies that promote an expressive debt 
reduction in over-indebted countries, which stimulates growth and recovers the ability of countries to 
perform countercyclical policies without harming growth. 
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Graph 1 - Evolution of public debt-to-GDP ratio and per-capita GDP growth rate, average of 12 euro area countries 
 
Graph 2 - Evolution of nonfinancial corporations' debt-to-GDP ratio and per-capita GDP growth rate, average of 12 euro 
area countries 
 






Graph 3 - Evolution of national debt-to-GDP ratio (as defined in section 1) and per-capita GDP growth rate, average of 12 
euro area countries 
 










Variable Periods Source Observations
Public debt 1995-2015 AMECO Values of public debt as defined by the Maastricht Treaty
EUROSTAT
Values of NFC' debt , including (F2)Currency and Deposits, (F3) 
Debt Securities, (F4) Loans, (F6)Insurance, Pension Funds and 
Standardized Guarantee Schemes and (F8) Other account 
receivable/payable
BIS
Values of NFC' debt  includes (F3) Debt Securities and (F4) 
Loans
Per-Capita Real GDP 1990-2015 AMECO
The series was extended back to 1990 in order to perform the 
2SLS without loosing observations
Age-Dependency Ratio 1995-2015 EUROSTAT
School Life Expectancy in Tertiary 
Education
1995-2015 ONU / EUROSTAT
Obtained by filling the missing values of the series of EUROSTAT 
with the values of the series of ONU, summed with the average 
differences between them
Government Final Consumption 1995-2015 AMECO/EUROSTAT
Obtained by filling the missing values of the series of AMECO 
with the values of the series of EUROSTAT, summed with the 
average differences between them
Total Gross Savings 1995-2015 AMECO
Inflation 1995-2015 OECD
Openness 1995-2015 AMECO
Population Growth Rate 1995-2015 EUROSTAT
Terms of Trade Growth Rate 1995-2015 AMECO
NFC' debt 1995-2015




Table 5 - Hausman Test’s Results 
 
Table 6 – Lagged Per-capita GDP 2SLS procedure with 4 lags 
 
Table 7 – Lagged Per-capita GDP 2SLS procedure with 4 lags 
 
A: FE2SLS B: RE2SLS Coef. Diff S.E. Diff
Lpubdebt 9.86 7.63 2.22 1.14
Oldage -0.37 -0.29 -0.09 0.12
Tertiary 1.11 -0.59 1.70 0.53
G -0.13 0.65 0.53 0.20
GRSTot 0.80 0.48 0.32 0.09
Inf 0.05 -0.09 0.15 0.00
Openn -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.02
PopGr 0.18 0.17 0.02 0.00
TofTr -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00
A is consistent under H0 and H1 (A = FE2SLS) B is consistent under H0 (B = RE2SLS)
H0: coef(A) - coef(B)  = 0 H = 101.394285 ~ Chi2(9)
H1: coef(A) - coef(B) ≠ 0 p-value = 0.0000 
Coefficient S.E: T-Stat Coefficient S.E: T-Stat
Ly i,t-2 -1.34 0.19 -7.01 -1.09 0.20 -5.33
Ly i,t-3 0.88 0.37 2.39 0.27 0.40 0.67
Ly i,t-4 0.09 0.36 0.25 0.98 0.48 2.03
Ly i,t-5 0.36 0.19 1.87 -0.18 0.29 -0.61
dtert i,t -0.05 0.04 -1.16 -0.09 0.04 -2.06
dLS i,t -0.29 0.05 -5.93 -0.21 0.05 -4.36
inf i,t 0.02 0.00 4.37 0.01 0.00 2.82
dLOpen i,t -0.34 0.09 -3.94 -0.31 0.09 -3.61
pop i,t 0.00 0.00 3.56 0.01 0.00 4.07
Short-Run Medium-Run
Coefficient S.E: T-Stat Coefficient S.E: T-Stat
Ly i,t-2 -1.67 0.16 -10.53 -1.48 0.17 -8.55
Ly i,t-3 1.66 0.16 10.42 1.47 0.17 8.43
dtert i,t -0.05 0.04 -1.16 -0.09 0.04 -2.02
dLS i,t -0.29 0.05 -5.93 -0.21 0.05 -4.14
inf i,t 0.02 0.00 5.05 0.02 0.00 3.78
dLOpen i,t -0.31 0.09 -3.47 -0.30 0.09 -3.39
pop i,t 0.00 0.00 3.14 0.01 0.00 3.94
Short-Run Medium-Run








Ld i,t-2 -0.02 0.00 -6.53
dtert i,t 0.15 0.13 1.22
dLS i,t 0.57 0.16 3.63
inf i,t -0.01 0.01 -0.48
dLOpen i,t 0.05 0.28 0.17
pop i,t -0.02 0.00 -5.56
